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Media and Foreign Policy: Comparative Study of Journalists’ Perceptions of 
Press-Government Relations during the Six-Party Talks 
Abstract 
This study examines journalists’ role conceptions in their coverage of diplomatic issues, 
based on a survey of South Korean, U.S., and European journalists who covered the six-party 
talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. The author found differences between South Korean, 
U.S., and European journalists in their perceptions of journalists’ role in the multilateral nuclear 
talks. Compared with U.S. and European journalists, South Korean journalists believed more 
strongly that journalists are participants in the negotiation process and that news sources have 
significant influence on their judgments of the newsworthiness of issues related to the talks. This 
comparative study offers important implications for the press-government relationships in 
foreign affairs issues.  
Keywords: journalists; foreign policy; North Korea; six-party talks; media sociology 
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A Comparative Study of Journalists’ Perceptions of 
Press-Government Relations during the Six-Party Talks 
The role of the media in foreign affairs and international issues has garnered growing 
attention from scholars, as it has been assumed that the end of the Cold War and advances in 
communication technologies have increased the ability of the media to influence the foreign 
policy process (Gilboa 2006). While scholars have presented different opinions and findings 
regarding the media’s roles in shaping foreign policy decision-making (Gilboa 2006; Gowing 
1994; Livingston 1997; Robinson 2002; Strobel 1997), it is generally acknowledged that news 
media coverage can sometimes influence foreign policy processes (Entman 2004; Gilboa 2002, 
2006; Sparre 2001). That is particularly the case when countries use the media for 
communication with parties with whom they don’t have effective or viable dialogue channels 
(Burns 1996; Gilboa 2002, 2006; Sparre 2001). Despite significant attempts to explain whether 
and how the media can influence foreign policy (e.g., Bennett 1990; Entman 2004; Gilboa 2002, 
2006; Livingston 1997; Mermin 1999; Robinson 2002), demonstrating the media’s involvement 
in complex foreign policy processes remains a major challenge.  
One of the most important topics to examine in this area of research is how journalists 
view their roles in foreign policy, as studies have shown that journalists’ subjective beliefs 
influence their news decisions (Donsbach 2004; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Patterson and 
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Donsbach 1996; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Starck and Soloski 1977). However, not enough 
empirical research has dealt with a specific topic of journalists’ perceptions of their own role in 
foreign policy (Bell 1997; Cohen 1963, Fahmy and Johnson 2005; Hess 1996, 2005). This study 
attempts to fill part of that gap by investigating how diplomatic correspondents of a number of 
different countries perceive their roles in foreign policy.  
The event this study focuses on is the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions, a negotiation process that began in 2003 and has continued, unfinished, through early 
2009. Involving the United States, the two Koreas, China, Japan, and Russia, the talks serve as 
an important opportunity to explore the press-government relationship. The six-party talks 
feature some elements of media diplomacy (Gilboa 2000, 2006; Sparre 2001; Van Dinh 1987), as 
the participating governments have often used the media to convey their positions to their 
counterparts or to influence the atmosphere of the negotiations.1 In addition, the six-party 
nuclear talks are instances of closed-door diplomacy, which poses a great challenge to reporters 
because governments release only technical aspects of the negotiation process to the media and 
excludes the more substantive aspects (Gilboa 2000:282). While journalists have very limited 
access to the event, they are under tremendous pressure from their editors and the public to offer 
information about it (Donsbach 2004; Gilboa 2000). In this sense, the six-party nuclear talks can 
                                                            
1 Sanger, David. 2003. “North Korea Says It May Test an A-bomb.” The New York Times, 29 August. 
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be regarded as a culmination of the ways in which government and media influence each other 
with regards to foreign affairs issues. 
This study focuses on journalists’ role conceptions in examining press-government 
relationships during the six-party talks. As previous studies have suggested, journalists’ 
perspectives of their roles can influence the way they cover certain issues (Donsbach 2004; 
Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Patterson and Donsbach 1996; Fahmy and Johnson 2005; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Soloski 1997; Starck and Soloski 1977). Based on a survey of 
journalists who covered the six-party talks, this study examines whether journalists perceive their 
roles in foreign policy to be primarily neutral messenger or active participant roles. This study 
also investigates how journalists from different countries differ in their perceptions of the 
media’s role in the six-party talks. Also examined are factors influencing journalists’ 
perspectives on the media’s roles during the six-party talks. This study concludes by assessing 
the implications of the findings in regard to journalistic performance and academic research.  
 
Theory 
Influences on journalists’ performance 
What influences a journalist’s coverage of news events? This has been one of the most 
popular questions in journalism research, given the impact of journalists’ coverage of certain 
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issues on audiences’ perceptions of those issues (McCombs 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; 
Wanta, Golan, and Lee 2004). Accordingly, scholars have presented diverse approaches to 
answering it and have identified factors at different levels that influence journalists’ news 
decisions (Donsbach 2004; Fahmy and Johnson 2005; Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab 1991; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Starck and Soloski 1997). According to Donsbach (2004), there are 
four main areas that need to be analyzed: news factors, institutional objectives, the manipulative 
power of news sources, and the subjective beliefs of journalists. News factors refer to 
professional assessments of the newsworthiness of events. Institutional objectives are 
expectations or pressures journalists face as a result of their employment status. The 
manipulative power of news sources concerns the influence of news sources, such as public 
relations people, on journalists’ news decisions. The area of subjective beliefs of journalists 
covers how their prior knowledge of or attitude towards a news event, as well as their ideological 
stances, affect their coverage of the event.   
Of these various factors, the influence of individual journalists’ subjective beliefs on 
news decisions has generated important arguments among professional journalists and 
journalism scholars (Donsbach 2004; Fahmy and Johnson 2005; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). 
Empirical evidence has shown that the characteristics of individual journalists affect their 
coverage of certain issues. Individual-level factors that have been analyzed in this area of 
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research include personality, values, religion, experience, attitudes, and role conceptions (Bissell 
2000; Fahmy and Johnson 2005; Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab 1991; Shoemaker and Reese 
1996; Starck and Soloski 1997). For example, Bissell found in her study of photographic 
decision making at a newspaper that photographic gatekeepers’ decisions were influenced by 
their political preferences, perceptions of audience expectations and personal opinion about 
explicitness (2000:90). Fahmy and Johnson’s (2005) survey of 159 embedded journalists 
covering the Iraq war found that the journalists believed individual-level factors such as 
individual values and professional norms influenced their reporting of the war. In addition, 
Chang and Lee (1992) showed that individual differences and organizational constraints affect 
newspaper editors’ foreign news selection. Based on a nationwide survey of news editors, Chang 
and Lee found that the political ideology and professional experience of the editors were 
significant factors in their selection of international news.  
 
Journalists’ Role Conception 
Some studies focused on journalists’ role conceptions as a potential factor influencing 
their journalistic performance. Weaver and Wilhoit identified three journalistic role conceptions: 
interpretive function, dissemination function, and adversary function (1986:137-140). According 
to Weaver and Wilhoit, the interpretive function refers to investigating government claims, 
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analyzing complicated issues, and discussing public policies in a timely manner. The 
dissemination function is that of providing information quickly to the public, while trying not to 
report unverified facts. The adversary function refers to being critical of government officials 
and businesses.  
Donsbach and Patterson’s (2004) study provides a useful framework for examining this 
area by specifying two dimensions of journalists’ role conceptions: passive-active and neutral-
advocate. The passive-active dimension is based on the journalist’s “autonomy as a political 
actor” (Donsbach and Patterson 2004:265). Passive journalists will act as “the instrument[s] of 
actors outside the news system,” such as government officials, by taking their cues from outside 
actors (Donsbach and Patterson 2004:265). In comparison, active journalists are those who 
actively interpret and investigate news events. The neutral-advocate dimension is based on the 
journalist’s “positioning as a political actor” (Donsbach and Patterson 2004:265). While the 
neutral journalist does not take sides in partisan or policy disputes, the advocate journalist does 
so in a “consistent, substantial, and aggressive way” (Donsbach and Patterson 2004:265). These 
two dimensions were a basis for Donsbach and Patterson’s (2004) analysis of role conceptions 
held by journalists in five Western countries.  
While Donsbach and Patterson (2004) saw the activeness and neutrality of journalists as 
two distinct dimensions, Cohen (1963) suggested correlations between the two aspects. 
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According to Cohen (1963), journalists who regard themselves as neutral messengers of 
information are more likely to become an “instrument of government,” as they tend to faithfully 
transmit what government officials say (1963:20). Therefore, Cohen indicates that journalists 
focusing on their neutral role will tend to remain passive in their coverage of news events while 
mainly relying on news sources. In comparison, Cohen believes (1963) that journalists who have 
the notion of being active participants are more likely to influence foreign policy by aggressively 
questioning government officials. 
Some empirical studies found that journalists’ role conception of these sorts can 
influence their performance. For example, Starck and Soloski (1977) found that journalism 
students’ attitudes toward the functional role of the media affected the type and content of the 
stories they produced. Starck and Soloski (1977) said students who regarded themselves as 
midway between the extreme neutral and the extreme participant role produced the most 
objective stories.  
 
Journalists and International Negotiations  
As this study analyzes how journalists from different countries see their roles in foreign 
policy and what factors influence their perspectives, it is important to examine international 
changes in recent years that might have affected how these journalists do their jobs. The two 
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most important changes that are regarded as having increased the media’s ability to influence 
foreign policy are the end of the Cold War and advances in communication technology (Gilboa 
2006). In the post-Cold War era, nations lack a manifest basis for laying out their foreign policy. 
In addition, the revolution in communication and information technologies has enabled global 
and live broadcasting 24 hours a day (Gilboa 2006). 
Against this backdrop, some scholars suggest that the dynamics between governments 
and the media have changed in the post-Cold War era (Entman 2004). For example, Entman 
(2004) proposed the cascading activation model, arguing that hegemony and indexing models 
fall short of explaining the media-government relationship in the 21st century. Hegemony and 
indexing approaches suggest that the media generally mirror or index the dialogue of elites, and 
thus lack independent and critical coverage of foreign policy issues (Bennett 1990; Entman 
2004; Mermin 1999). In comparison, the cascading activation model emphasizes the increased 
independent influence of the media on foreign policy issues (Entman 2004). According to 
Entman, the White House no longer holds a hegemony in controlling foreign policy discourse, 
and the media have enhanced their power to challenge the White House’s framing of foreign 
affairs issues.   
Some scholars have developed specific typologies to examine policy-media effects 
under this new environment (Livingston 1997; Gilboa 2002, 2006). Livingston’s (1997) 
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approach sees the media as an “accelerant” to policy decision-making, an “impediment” to the 
achievement of desired policy goals, or “agenda setting agency.” First, the media can accelerate 
policy decision-making by pushing officials for instantaneous responses to meet their news 
cycles. Second, the media can impede the pursuit of desired policy goals when their emotional 
coverage of international conflicts influences public opinion and when they expose sensitive 
security operations. Lastly, the media can influence a government’s foreign policy agenda. 
Examining the relations of media effects and eight types of military interventions, Livingston 
concluded that “different policies with different types and levels of media scrutiny produced 
different results” (1997:15). Other scholars also agree that the influence of the media is 
conditional (Gilboa 2002, 2006). 
One of the areas in which the media are most likely to influence foreign policy is 
international negotiations, especially when there is no direct channel of communication between 
the parties involved (Gilboa 2002, 2006; Jonsson 1996). Officials use the media to send signals 
and messages when they are not sure how their counterparts might respond to their proposals 
(Gilboa 2006). Gilboa called this “media diplomacy,” referring to the use of mass media to 
advance negotiations (2000, 2006). Nicholas Burns (1996), former U.S. State Department 
spokesperson, backed this claim when he acknowledged, “We use the briefings to send messages 
to foreign governments about our foreign policy. For example, I sometimes read carefully 
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calibrated statements to communicate with the governments with which we have no diplomatic 
relations: Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea (12-13).” The six-party dialogue on North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions is a recent example of media diplomacy (Gilboa 2000, 2006; Sparre 2001; Van 
Dinh 1987). The participating governments have often used the media to indicate their positions 
and intentions to the other parties and even to fly a “trial balloon.”2  Did the journalists who 
covered the six-party talks realize how the media could be used by governments to increase their 
bargaining power? This study will show how journalists think about this idea, as well as how 
they perceive the concepts behind the other research questions stated above. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As previous studies suggested (Cohen 1963; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Starck and 
Soloski 1977), the journalist’s role conception is an important factor influencing journalistic 
practice. This study examines how journalists from South Korean, U.S., and European media 
organizations who covered the six-party talks perceive their journalistic role in these 
international negotiations and how the particular factors discussed above influence their role 
conceptions. Based on this, the following research questions were posed.      
RQ1: How do journalists representing South Korean, U.S., and European news 
                                                            
2 An interview on 7 January 2008 with a South Korean official who participated in the six-party talks. 
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organizations perceive their role in the six-party talks?  
RQ2: What characteristics of these journalists predict perceptions of their role in the six-
party talks?  
Based on my professional experience as a working journalist covering the six-party talks 
as well as previous research on media sociology (Shoemaker and Reese 1996), it is assumed that 
social milieu of the journalist can influence perceptions of the international event and approach 
to the coverage of it. In particular, the region in which the journalist’s news organization is based 
may play a greater role in media coverage of the six-party talks because governments provide 
deeper background briefings to journalists from their own region. Therefore, this study posits the 
following hypotheses.    
H1: Journalists from South Korean, U.S., and European news organizations differ in 
their perceptions of journalists’ role in the six-party talks. 
H2: Journalists from South Korean, U.S., and European news organizations are differ in 




 For this study, I surveyed a sample of journalists from South Korean, U.S., and 
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European news organizations who covered at least one round of the six-party talks. Of the six 
countries involved in the negotiations, only South Korean and U.S. journalists were included 
because those two countries are more deeply engaged in the talks with North Korea than the 
other countries. Europe is included because the countries that comprise it are not party to the 
talks and in this regard provides contrast with South Korea and the U.S.  
 A list of 152 South Korean journalists and 73 U.S. journalists was compiled by 
searching South Korean and U.S. news reports on the six-party talks between August 2003 and 
March 2007. E-mail addresses for the journalists were obtained from the web sites of their media 
organizations or from the public relations departments of news outlets. European journalists were 
contacted through the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), which forwarded my 
recruitment e-mail to its 129 members. As shown in Appendix 1, a majority of these journalists 
are from the United Kingdom (27.9%), Germany (12.4%), Spain (11.6%), and France (10.9%).    
 As the target journalists were working in different countries—mostly in China, the 
United States, South Korea, Japan, and Russia—I used an online survey to reach them 
(Schonlau, 2002). Before inviting journalists to participate in the survey, I conducted interviews 
with seven South Korean and U.S. journalists to discuss their perspectives on journalists’ role in 
the six-party talks and other related issues. The interviews, along with a literature review and 
content analysis of news reports on the six-party talks, served as a basis for the survey 
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questionnaire. The journalists who participated in the interviews were not invited to take part in 
the final survey. I created the survey questionnaire through a professional online survey web site 
and sent personalized e-mails to all of the target journalists, directing them to the web-based 
questionnaire.  
The main dependent variable for this study was the journalists’ role conceptions in 
regard to the six-party talks. To measure journalists’ perceptions of professional roles in the six-
party talks, participants were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert-type scale how much they 
agree with each of three separate statements. The three statements were: (1) journalists are 
vulnerable to government manipulation; (2) journalists are neutral messengers of information; 
and (3) journalists become active participants in the process of diplomatic negotiations. In this 
study, the neutral messenger item connotes the idea of the neutral journalist (Donsbach and 
Patterson 2004) and the dissemination function of journalists (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986). The 
active participant item is related to the active journalist notion (Donsbach 2004) and the idea of 
the interpretive and adversary function of journalists (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986). These items 
were chosen after interviews with the seven South Korean and U.S. journalists who covered the 
six-party talks but were not part of the final survey. 
In addition, this study examined what factors affect journalists’ perceptions of the 
newsworthiness of issues related to the six-party talks. For this part of the study, respondents 
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were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert-type scale how influential five factors were in their 
perceptions of the newsworthiness of an event. The five factors were: news sources, their editors, 
other journalists, other media of their own country, and the media of other countries.  
 The independent variables for this study were the nationalities of the journalists, their 
professional experience, and their perceptions of the effectiveness of the six-party talks in 
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Their professional experience was measured by 
whether or not they were diplomatic correspondents and by how many rounds of the six-party 
talks they had covered. They were also asked to provide other demographic information, 




 A total of 109 journalists responded to the survey, but only 90 responses were used for 
the final analysis because the questionnaires of the others were incomplete. The 90 journalists 
included 45 South Korean journalists, 24 U.S. journalists, and 21 European journalists. 
Nationalities of the European journalists who participated in the survey are shown in Appendix 
2. The response rate was 29.6 percent for the South Korean journalists, 32.8 percent for the U.S. 
journalists, and 16.3% percent for the European journalists. The response rate for European 
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journalists may result from the recruitment email being sent collectively through the journalists’ 
association in China. Table 1 summarizes the demographic information of the participants. In 
terms of their experience in covering the six-party talks, more than 65 percent of them said they 
had reported on three or more rounds of the six-party talks. Also, about 40 percent of them 
regarded themselves as diplomatic correspondents. In regard to their area of work in journalism, 
55.6 percent work for newspapers, 18.9 percent for television, 17.8 percent for wire service, and 
4.4 percent for radio. When asked about their political orientation relative to North Korea, 45.5 
percent of the participants said they were liberal on North Korean issues, 42.2 percent said they 
were neutral on North Korean issues, and 12.2 percent said they were conservative. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 First of all, this study examined how South Korean, U.S., and European journalists 
perceive their role in the six-party talks (Figure 1). As noted above, the journalists were asked to 
rate their agreement with three statements: (1) journalists are vulnerable to government 
manipulation, (2) journalists are neutral messengers of information, and (3) journalists become 
active participants in the process of the diplomatic negotiations. Of the three statements 
presented, respondents agreed most on journalists’ vulnerability to government manipulation (M 
= 3.57, SD = 1.01), followed by journalists’ being neutral messengers of information (M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.07), and journalists’ becoming active participants in the diplomatic process (M = 3.13, 
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SD = 1.21). 
Next, this study examined whether or not there were any significant differences between 
the journalists of the three countries in their perceptions of the media’s role in foreign policy 
(H1). This issue was analyzed by a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). As shown in Table 
2, the three groups were significantly different only in regard to journalists’ becoming part of the 
negotiation process (F (2, 87) = 34.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .44), not for vulnerability to 
government manipulation or journalists’ being neutral messengers. Specifically, the South 
Korean group showed a significant difference when compared with each of the U.S. and 
European groups, but no such difference was found between U.S. and European journalists. 
South Korean journalists believed that journalists become participants in the process of the 
diplomatic negotiations (M = 3.93, SD = .62) to a greater extent than U.S. journalists (M = 2.42, 
SD = 1.18) and European journalists (M = 2.24, SD = 1.09). Non-parametric tests showed similar 
results.3 The three groups were statistically significantly different only regarding journalists’ 
becoming part of the negotiation process (χ2 (1, df=2) = 42.94, p < .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 
1 is partially supported.  
[Figure 1 and Table 2 about here] 
                                                            
3 Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted. There was no statistically significant difference between the three 
groups in regard to journalists’ being neutral messenger (χ2 (1, df=2) = 3.26, p = .20) and journalists’ 
being vulnerable to manipulation (χ2 (1, df=2) = .39, p = .82).     
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The next issue for analysis concerns what factors influence journalists’ perceptions of 
the media’s role in the six-party talks. This was examined by regression analysis, with the 
dependent variable being the respondent’s perception of journalists as being (i) part of the 
negotiation process, (ii) vulnerable to government manipulation, and (iii) neutral messenger. The 
independent variables included the journalist’s nationality, the number of rounds of the six-party 
talks the journalist covered, whether the journalist was diplomatic correspondent or not, and how 
effective the journalist believed the six-party talks to be. As shown in Table 3, when it comes to 
perceptions of journalists being part of the negotiation process, journalists’ nationality was the 
most important predictor (β = .72, p < .001), and the other significant factor was journalists’ 
perceptions of how effective the six-party talks are proving to be in resolving the nuclear issue (β 
= .18, p < .05). That is, the more effective journalists believe the six-party dialogue to be, the 
more likely they are to think that journalists become part of the negotiation process. 
Respondents’ professional experience, measured by whether or not they consider themselves to 
be diplomatic correspondents and by how many rounds of the six-party talks they have covered, 
was not a significant predictor of their perceptions of journalists’ roles as in the six-party talks. 
In regard to perceptions of journalists being vulnerable to government manipulation, none of the 
independent variables was significant. Variables that predicted the respondent’s perceptions of 
journalists’ being neutral messenger were the journalist’s nationality (β = .26, p < .05) and the 
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number of the six-party talks the journalist covered (β = .23, p < .05).  
[Table 3 about here]  
Finally, this study analyzed what influences journalists’ perceptions of the 
newsworthiness of issues related to the six-party talks (H2). As shown in Table 4, the journalists 
said they are the most influenced by their news sources (M = 3.99, SD = .87), followed by the 
media of other countries (M = 3.30, SD = .89), their editors (M = 3.21, SD = 1.08), the media of 
their own country (M = 3.14, SD = 1.08), and other journalists (M = 2.62, SD = .87). An 
ANOVA test showed there were statistically significant differences between the three groups in 
their perceptions of the influence of news sources on their judgments of the newsworthiness of 
issues related to the six-party talks (F (2, 87) = 10.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .20). According to 
Bonferroni’s post hoc test, the mean comparisons of the South Korean group with each of the 
U.S. and European groups were statistically significant, but the difference was not significant 
between U.S. and European journalists. South Korean journalists (M = 4.36, SD = .61) believed 
that news sources influence their perceptions of the newsworthiness of events to a greater extent 
than U.S. journalists (M = 3.46, SD = 1.06) and European journalists (M = 3.81, SD = .75). Non-
parametric tests showed similar results.4 The three groups were statistically significantly 
                                                            
4 Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted. There was no statistically significant difference between the three 
groups in regard to the influence on their news judgment of media of other countries (χ2 (1, df=2) = 1.51, 
p = .93), other journalists (χ2 (1, df=2) = .80, p = .67), and editors (χ2 (1, df=2) = .21, p = .90). 
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different in regard to the influence of news sources on their judgment of newsworthiness (χ2 (1, 
df=2) = 16.50, p < .001). In addition, the three groups were different in their assessing of the 
influence of media of their own country on their news judgment about issues related to six-party 
talks (χ2 (1, df=2) = 8.09, p < .05). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
This study investigated how journalists covering foreign affairs defined their 
professional roles in relation to policy decision-making. Examining this issue is important 
because previous studies have shown that journalists’ perceptions of their roles can influence the 
ways they do their job (Donsbach 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Soloski 1997; Starck and 
Soloski 1977). More importantly, media reports of foreign affairs and international issues can 
significantly influence audiences’ perceptions of those issues because audiences rely heavily on 
mass media for information about such matters due to lack of their personal access (Brewer 
2006; Elasmar 2007; Wanta, Golan and Lee 2004). 
The survey of journalists who covered the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions shows the respondents most strongly agreeing that journalists are vulnerable to 
government manipulation in their coverage of the nuclear talks. They said the main reason for 
Media and Foreign Policy 22  
this is their limited access to relevant information. Therefore, journalists acknowledge they may 
end up mirroring or indexing the discourse of government officials (Bennett 1990; Mermin 
1999), especially in situations like the six-party talks to which their access is extremely limited. 
In addition, journalists more strongly agreed with the idea that journalists are neutral messengers 
of information than that they become active participants in the negotiation process. This seems to 
reflect journalists’ norm of objectivity (Mindich 1998; Reese 1997; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; 
Shoemaker and Vos in press; Zelizer 2004).  
It is also important to note that the findings of this study indicate that the journalists of 
different countries have different notions about being a neutral messenger of information and/or 
an active participant during the six-party talks. In this study, being an active participant was a 
reflection of journalists being able to influence the negotiation processes. While the U.S. 
journalists believed the two functions were almost opposite, the South Korean journalists 
believed that the two could go hand-in-hand. What can explain this finding? This study shows 
that journalists’ professional experience and their perceptions of the effectiveness of the six-party 
talks had no significant, or only minimal, influence on how journalists perceive their roles. 
Instead, the nationality of the journalists was the major predictor of how they see their roles in 
foreign policy. Therefore, it can be argued that the differences may be accounted for by the 
different stakes the countries have in the six-party talks as well as by different professional 
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orientations in the different countries. It is likely that South Korean journalists, who live in a 
country bordering North Korea, may believe the North Korean nuclear issue is an urgent matter 
that needs to be resolved to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, they may hope for a 
more active role on the part of the media to influence the talks. Moreover, South Korean 
journalists think they can do so while remaining neutral messengers of information. In 
comparison, when the U.S. journalists think of being neutral messengers and active participants 
(Cohen, 1963), they seem to regard the question more as representing the neutral-advocate 
dimension suggested by Donsbach and Patterson (2004). The neutral journalist does not take 
sides in policy disputes, whereas the advocate journalist does so consistently (Donsbach and 
Patterson 2004). For the U.S. journalists, attempting to influence the talks would be beyond their 
journalistic role and would prevent them from remaining neutral on the issues of concern.  
While previous research on Western journalists has indicated that journalists who 
perceive their roles to be those of active participants in foreign policy processes are more likely 
to play a watchdog role (Cohen 1963; Weaver and Willhoit 1986), the findings of this study 
suggest this may not be so for South Korean journalists. South Korean journalists, who most 
strongly believed that journalists become active participants in the negotiation process, were the 
most heavily affected by news sources in their news decisions. The South Korean journalists said 
news sources, in this case government officials for the most part, have an important influence on 
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their perceptions of the newsworthiness of issues related to the six-party talks, to a greater extent 
than the Western journalists. This may indicate that the degree of cooperation between the 
government and the press relative to the six-party talks is greater in the case of South Korea than 
the United States and Europe. Therefore, South Korean journalists are not necessarily more 
independent from or critical of their own government’s policies on the six-party talks than their 
U.S. and European counterparts.  
In sum, this study showed that journalists’ nationality was the major factor influencing 
how journalists of different countries regard their role in foreign policy. Compared with U.S. and 
European journalists, South Korean journalists more strongly believed that journalists can and do 
become active participants in the six-party talks. The three groups of journalists also differed in 
their perspectives on the influence of news sources in their coverage of the six-party talks. These 
findings have important implications because previous studies have shown that journalists’ role 
conceptions and their perspectives on the issues they cover can influence how they report on 
issues (Donsbach 2004; Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Fahmy and Johnson 2005; Patterson and 
Donsbach 1996; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Soloski 1997). In particular, the comparative 
approach of this study contributes to advancing research in this area (Donsbach and Patterson 
2004). The findings presented here help explain how journalists of different countries cover 
crucial international negotiations. Future research should examine journalists covering different 
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international negotiations to develop more general. 
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Appendix 1 
Nationalities of European journalists contacted for the survey  
Nationality Number Percentage 
U.K.  36 27.9 
Germany  16 12.4 
Spain  15 11.6 
France  14 10.9 
Denmark 9 7.0 
Italy 8 6.2 
Sweden 6 4.7 
Netherland  4 3.1 
Ireland 3 2.3 
Norway 3 2.3 
Switzerland 3 2.3 
Other 12 9.3 
Total    129    100 
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Appendix 2 
Nationalities of European journalists participated in the survey  
Nationality Number Percentage 
U.K.  4 19.0 
France 3 14.3 
Germany  2 9.5 
Italy  2 9.5 
Denmark 1 4.8 
Finland 1 4.8 
Ireland 1 4.8 
Netherland  1 4.8 
Portugal 1 4.8 
Spain 1 4.8 
No response   4 19.0 
Total    21 100 
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Table 1   



















One or two 42.2% 33.4% 19.0% 34.5% 
Three or four 42.2 20.8 38.1 35.6 
Five or six 6.6 29.1 23.8 16.7 
Seven or eight 8.9 16.6 19.0 13.4 









 0%  
 
  4.2%  
 
 0%  
 
  1.1%  
Somewhat 
conservative 
13.3 16.7 0 11.1 
Neutral 31.1 54.2 52.4 42.2 
Somewhat 
liberal 
51.1 25.0 42.9 42.2 
Very liberal 4.4 0 4.8 3.3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 












Television 20.0 12.5 23.8 18.9 
Wire service 17.8 20.8 14.3 17.8 
Radio 8.3 0 9.5 4.4 
Magazine 0 4.2 0 1.1 
Online 4.4 0 0 2.2 
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Table 2 
ANOVA results for journalists’ perceptions of journalists’ role in the six-party talks 
 
Variable South Korea U.S. Europe Total Levene’s test sig. 
F 




3.93a (.62) 2.42b (1.18) 2.24b (1.09) 3.13 (1.21) .02* 34.80*** 
Vulnerable to 
manipulation 3.60 (.94) 3.46 (1.06) 3.62 (1.12) 3.57 (1.01) .66 .19 
Neutral 
messenger 3.52 (1.06) 3.58 (.97) 3.10 (1.18) 3.44 (1.07)  .56  .49 
Note. *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001  
Entries are mean values with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3  
Regression analysis of predictors of perceptions of journalists’ role in the six-party talks   
Dependent variable Participants in negotiations Vulnerable to manipulation Neutral messenger 
Independent variables β R2 Adjusted 
 R2 
β R2 Adjusted 
R2 




 -.06   -.10   .13   
Number of talks covered  .04   -.09    .23*   
Perceptions of 
effectiveness of the talks 
 .18*   -.02   -.10   
Nationality (U.S.)  .09   -.06   .20   
Nationality (S. Korea)  .72*** .51 .48 .01 .02 .00  .26* .12 .07 
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Table 4 
ANOVA results for journalists’ perceptions of influential forces on their perceived 
newsworthiness of issues related to the six-party talks 
 
Variable South Korea U.S. Europe Total Levene’ 
test sig.  
F  
N=45 N=24 N=21 N=90 
News sources 4.36a (.61) 3.46b (1.06) 3.81b (.75) 3.99 (.87) .02* 10.96*** 
Editors 3.18 (.81) 3.33 (1.31) 3.14 (1.32) 3.21 (1.08)   .003** .22 
Media (same 
country) 2.96 (.88) 3.67 (1.05) 2.95 (1.32) 3.14 (1.08) .20 4.12 
Media (other 
countries) 3.38 (.83) 3.25 (.99) 3.19 (.93) 3.30 (.89) .43 .36 
Other journalists 2.71 (.79) 2.48 (.98) 2.62 (.92) 2.62 (.87) .31 .66 
*p < .05  **p < .01   ***p < .001  
Entries are mean values with standard deviations in parentheses. 
a and b indicate statistically significant mean differences by Bonferroni’s post hoc test. 











Figure 1. Journalists’ perceptions of journalists’ role in the six party talks.  
Note. Question: Here are some statements about journalists’ role in the six-party talks. Please 
indicate how much you agree or disagree with these statements, with a scale from one to five 
where one means strongly disagree and five means strongly agree. The three statements: (1) 
journalists are vulnerable to government manipulation; (2) journalists are neutral messengers of 
information; and (3) journalists become active participants in the process of the diplomatic 
negotiations.  
  
